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This paper analyzes the information-theoretical security of the Differential 
Phase Shift (DPS) Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol, using efficient 
computational information geometric algorithms. The DPS QKD protocol was 
introduced for practical reasons, since the earlier QKD schemes were too 
complicated to implement in practice. The DPS QKD protocol can be an 
integrated part of current network security applications, hence it’s practical 
implementation is much easier with the current optical devices and optical 
networks. The proposed algorithm could be a very valuable tool to answer 
the still open questions related to the security bounds of the DPS QKD 
protocol.   
 
 
 
1   Introduction 
 
The DPS QKD scheme was designed to offer a well-implementable and more efficient 
practical solution with better key generation rates to realize quantum cryptography, 
than classical QKD approaches. In the DPS quantum cryptography protocol, the 
sender and the receiver use weak coherent state pulses, and logical bits are encoded 
in the relative phase of the pulses. The sender encodes every logical bit in two signals, 
and at the receiver’s side, Bob use the two signals to decode the sent logical bit. The 
relevance of the DPS QKD protocol could have been increased dramatically in 
practical applications, since the differential phase shift QKD protocol is much more 
simpler in hardware design than the well known QKD protocols, such as BB84 or the 
Six-state QKD protocols. On the other side, contrary to it’s easy implementation and 
it’s much simpler working mechanism, the DPS QKD’s protocol unconditional 
  
security is still not proven. Our geometrical analysis shows an efficient algorithmical 
solution to quantify the secure key generation rate of the DPS QKD protocol, which 
is still missing from the literature. The possible attacks against the DPS protocol 
have been studied deeply. This paper analyzes the security of the DPS QKD protocol, 
using information geometric algorithms, and different quantum cloner models. As the 
most general attack against the protocol, we analyze coherent attacks, based on two 
different types of quantum cloner machines.  
This paper is organized as follows. First is a short brief on the DPS QKD 
protocol, and then follows a discussion of the basic elements of computational 
geometry and quantum information theory. Then we explain the main elements of 
the present information geometric based approach. Then we show the results on the 
information-theoretic security analysis of DPS QKD protocol. Finally, we summarize 
the results.    
 
2   DPS QKD Protocol  
 
In today's communication networks, the widespread use of optical fiber and passive 
optical elements allows to use quantum cryptography in the current standard optical 
network infrastructure. In the past few years, quantum key distribution schemes have 
attracted much study. The security of modern cryptographic methods, like 
asymmetric cryptography, relies heavily on the problem of factoring large integers 
[3]. In the future, if quantum computers become reality, any information exchange 
using current classical cryptographic schemes will be immediately insecure [3, 9]. 
Current classical cryptographic methods are not able to guarantee long-term security. 
Other cryptographic methods, with absolute security must be applied in the future. 
Cryptography based on the principles of quantum theory is known as quantum 
cryptography.  
Using current network technology, in order to spread quantum cryptography, 
interfaces must be implemented that are able to manage together the quantum and 
classical channels [2, 3, 9].  In practical implementations of QKD protocols, Alice, the 
sender, uses weak coherent pulses (WCP) instead of a single photon source [47]. As 
has been shown, WCP based protocols have a security threat, since an eavesdropper 
can perform a photon number splitting attack against the protocol [1, 2]. These kinds 
of attacks are based on the fact that some weak coherent pulses contain more than 
one photon in the same polarization state, which provides information to the 
eavesdropper without any disturbance. The DPS protocol is robust against such 
photon number splitting attacks in practice, however a theoretical lower bound on 
the security of the protocol is still missing from the literature [1, 2]. The working 
mechanism of the DPS QKD protocol is based on the same idea as the B92 protocol: 
even two non-orthogonal quantum states are sufficient to perform a secure quantum 
key distribution. In the DPS protocol, Alice encodes the logical bits in the phase of 
  
the pulses. If the phases are modulated by 0, then Alice sends a logical zero, and if 
the phase between the two pulses is p , then she encodes a logical one. If the relative 
phase between two pulses is 0, then Bob will detect 0, and similarly, if the phase 
between the two pulses is p , then he will obtain a logical 1.  
In the sending process, Alice generates coherent states of the same intensity m , and 
from these states she forms a sequence, as follows: [47]  
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where the phases can be set at 0 or p , hence for a logical zero we have , 
and for a logical one, the difference between the two phases is p , and . 
Since the logical bits are encoded in the phases between the signals, the k -th signal 
has relevance in the determination of both the k -th and ( -th logical bits, 
hence 
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complexity of any security analysis [1, 2]. From this viewpoint, the DPS protocol has 
been analyzed by Takesue and Diamanti et al. [18]. In this paper we show that the 
complexity of the DPS QKD protocol’s security analysis can be decreased 
dramatically, using fast computational information geometric methods. 
The security of the DPS QKD protocol lies in the fact that the sender randomly 
prepares and sends to Bob two non-orthogonal quantum states, similarly to the B92 
protocol. The DPS QKD protocol geometrically can be modeled in the same way as 
the B92 protocol, however its implementation is much easier in practice, since the 
DPS QKD protocol does not require a bright reference pulse as does the B92 protocol 
[1, 2]. In practical implementations the DPS scheme can be realized by WCP pulses 
with an average photon number less than 1, and the sent WCP pulse can be 
described by  
2
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where 2 1a m=   is the average photon number per pulse [1, 2]. The B92 
protocol uses the same 0,  modulation-scheme, however the B92 protocol practical 
implementation is more complicated than the DPS QKD’s scheme [1, 2]. 
p
The general setup of the DPS QKD protocol is illustrated in Figure 1. The time 
difference between the pulses is known at the receiver’s device.  
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Figure 1. A schematic view of DPS QKD protocol. Alice uses Weak Coherent Pulses (WCP) 
and a Phase Modulator (PM) to generate the signals. Bob decodes them with Beam Splitters 
(BS1, BS2) and photon detectors (D0, D1). 
 
The optimal secure key rate of the protocol has been guaranteed only for individual 
attacks where the eavesdropper acts on the photons individually [1, 2]. In our 
geometrical security analysis, we will analyze the most general collective attacker 
model, since the security of DSP QKD protocol against this general attack still 
remains an open question. In this attacker model, we analyze only the cloned 
photons from the given pulse, and we will give an approximation on the information 
obtainable by the eavesdropper. Our analysis focuses on the eavesdropper’s 
information about the given key, and the uses the eavesdropper’s cloned quantum 
states. In the experimental realization of DPS QKD protocol, the signal consists of a 
weak coherent state and a strong phase reference. The relative optical phase between 
weak coherent state and reference pulse is either 0 or p , and these kinds of signals 
were already used in classical QKD schemes. In our attacker model, for simplicity we 
model these signals as two non-orthogonal quantum states, and we will analyze the 
still open questions related to the lower bounds on eavesdropper’s obtainable 
information. As has been shown by Inoue [1] and Honjo [2], the photon number 
splitting attacks can not be realized only with zero-error, and several other attacks 
have been studied by Curty, Tamaki, and Moroder [19], Waks, Takesue, and 
Yamamoto [20], Branciard et al. [21], Curty et al. [22], Tsurumaru et al. [23], 
Branciard, Gisin, and Scarani [24], and Gomez-Sousa and Curty [25]. In this paper, 
we will use the results of Inoue et al. [1] and Honjo et al. [2]. We will analyze the 
most common attacker model against DPS protocol, to analyze geometrically its 
information-theoretical security.  
 
2.1   Computational Geometry in QKD Analysis 
 
Many challenging hard algorithmic problems can be studied with computational 
geometry and, at present, there exist many geometric algorithms that offer an 
  
efficient and well implementable solution for hard computational problems. 
Computational Geometry was originally focused on the construction of efficient 
algorithms and it provides a very valuable and efficient tool for computing hard tasks 
[13]. In many cases, the traditional linear programming methods are not very 
efficient. The computation of the convex hull between quantum states cannot be 
computed efficiently by linear programming, however the methods of computational 
geometry are better at solving these kinds of hard problems [5, 6, 7, 8, 15]. 
Computational Geometry uses the results of classical geometry and the power of 
computing. In Figure 2, we illustrate the logical structure of the analysis and the 
cooperation of classical and quantum systems. To this day, the most efficient 
classical algorithms for this purpose are computational geometric methods. We use 
these classical computational geometric tools to analyze the security of DPS QKD 
protocol. 
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Figure 2. Logical structure of our analysis. We use current classical architectures to analyze 
the properties of quantum channels. 
 
In this paper, we use the methods of computational geometry to analyze the security 
of quantum channels, however we use quantum information as a distance measure 
instead of classical geometric distances. Unlike ordinary geometric distances, a 
quantum informational distance is not a metric and it is not symmetric, hence this 
pseudo-distance features as a measure of informational distance. This paper combines 
the results of information geometry and the fast methods of computational geometry. 
Using the quantum informational distance as a distance measure, we analyze the 
privacy of eavesdropped quantum channels [17].  
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Figure 3. Quantum information as distance measure in classical computational geometric 
methods. 
  
From the combination of the quantum informational distance function and classical 
computational geometric methods, the properties of quantum channels and quantum 
states in quantum space can be analyzed as geometrical objects in geometrical space.  
The application of information geometry in the quantum space has been studied by 
Nielsen and Nock [31-36], Kato et al. [46], Hayashi et al. [38] and Cortese [40-41]. 
The properties of quantum informational distance and quantum relative entropy 
function have been analyzed by Ohya and Petz [42-43], Petz [44-45] and Hayashi [39].  
 
2.2   Preliminaries 
 
The security of QKD schemes relies on the no-cloning theorem [3, 4, 10, 11, 12]. 
Contrary to classical information, in a quantum communication system, quantum 
information cannot be copied perfectly. If Alice sends a number of photons 
1 2, , , Ny y y  through the quantum channel, an eavesdropper is not interested 
in copying an arbitrary state, only the possible polarization states of the attacked 
QKD scheme. The unknown states cannot be cloned perfectly, the cloning process of 
quantum states is possible only if the information being cloned is classical, hence the 
quantum states are all orthogonal. The polarization states in the QKD protocols are 
not all orthogonal states, which makes it impossible for an eavesdropper to copy the 
sent quantum states [3, 9]. Our goal is to measure the level of quantum cloning 
activity on the quantum channel, using fast computational geometric methods. We 
measure the information-theoretical impacts of quantum cloning activity in the 
quantum channel. Alice’s side is modeled by a random variable 
 Bob’s side can be modeled by another random 
variable Y. The Shannon entropy for the discrete random variable X is denoted by 
, which can be defined as , for conditional random 
variables, the probability of random variable X given Y is denoted by 
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Alice sends a random variable to Bob, who produces an output signal with a given 
probability. We analyze in a geometrical way the effects of Eve’s quantum cloner on 
Bob’s received quantum state. Eve’s cloner in the quantum channel increases the 
uncertainty in X, given Bob’s output Y. The information-theoretical noise of Eve’s 
quantum cloner increases the conditional Shannon entropy (H X Y ) , where 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
, log
X YN N
i j i j
i j
Y p x y p x y
= =
= -ååH X . Our geometrical security analysis is 
focused on the cloned mixed quantum state received by Bob.  
This paper analyzes the phase-covariant cloner and the universal quantum cloner 
(UCM) model, since both quantum cloners can be applied in attacks against DPS 
QKD protocol [10, 11, 12]. In the general attacker model, Alice’s pure state is 
  
denoted by , Eve’s cloner is modeled by an affine map   and Bob’s mixed input 
state is denoted by . In our calculations, we can use the fact that for 
random variables X and Y, 
Ar
( )Ar s= B
( ) ( ) (, )Y H X H Y= +H X X , where H(X),  
and 
( ),H X Y
(H Y )X  are defined in terms of probability distributions p x  and ( ), ( ),p x y
(p y x ) . We measure in a geometrical representation the information which can be 
transmitted in the presence of an eavesdropper on the quantum channel.  
In Figure 4, we illustrate Eve’s quantum cloner on the quantum channel. Alice’s 
pure state is denoted by , the eavesdropper’s quantum cloner transformation is 
denoted by  . The mixed state received by Bob is represented by . In our 
information geometric security analysis, we would like to compute the information 
obtainable by the eavesdropper. The informational-theoretic security of the DPS 
QKD protocol is analyzed by the radius of the eavesdropper’s smallest enclosing 
quantum informational ball. 
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Figure 4. The analyzed attacker model and entropies. 
 
In general, for a private communication channel, we seek to maximize  and 
minimize 
( )H X
(H X Y )  in order to maximize the radius of the smallest enclosing ball, 
which describes the maximal transmittable information from Alice to Bob in the 
attacked quantum channel. Classically, this information can be expressed as 
( ) ( )H X H X Y- . 
In our information-theoretic security analysis, we would like to measure the 
information which can be obtained by the eavesdropper, using advanced collective 
attacker model. As we will see, this quantity can be described by the radius of the 
smallest enclosing quantum informational ball of the eavesdropper’s, using the 
Holevo quantity. Geometrically, the presence of an eavesdropper causes a detectable 
mapping to change from a noiseless one-to-one relationship to a stochastic map. If 
  
there is no cloning activity on the channel, then ( ) 0,H X Y =  and the radius of the 
smallest enclosing quantum informational ball on Bob’s side will be maximal. 
 
2.3   Measuring Quantum Informational Distances between Quantum 
States  
 
A quantum state can be described by its density matrix , which is a d d  
matrix, where d is the level of the given quantum system. For an n qubit system, the 
level of the quantum system is . We use the fact that particle state 
distributions can be analyzed probabilistically by means of density matrices. A two-
level quantum system can be defined by its density matrices in the following way:  
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where i denotes the complex imaginary  The density matrix  
can be identified with a point (  in 3-dimensional space, and a ball B  formed 
by such points 
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  the eigenvalue 
decomposition  is  where  is  for i  and 0 for  For 
a mixed state ,  defined by  In quantum 
cryptography the encoded pure quantum states are sent through a quantum 
communication channel. Using the Bloch sphere representation, the quantum state  
can be given as a three-dimensional point r  in  and it can be 
represented in spherical coordinates , where r is the radius of the 
quantum state to the origin,  and  represents the latitude and longitude rotation 
angles.  
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The classical Shannon-entropy of a discrete d-dimensional distribution p is given 
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.   The von Neumann entropy  of 
quantum states is a generalization of the classical Shannon entropy to density 
matrices [6, 7]. The entropy of quantum states is given by    
The quantum entropy  is equal to the Shannon entropy for the eigenvalue 
distribution  where d is the level of the quantum 
system. The relative entropy in classical systems is a measure that quantifies how 
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close a probability distribution p is to a model or candidate probability distribution q 
[4, 6]. For p and q probability distributions, the relative entropy is given by 
( ) 2log ii
i i
p
D p q p
q
= å ,  while the relative entropy between quantum states is 
measured by  
( ) ( )log log .D Trr s r r sé ù= -ë û                               (4) 
To compute the radius  of the smallest informational ball of quantum states and 
the entropies between the cloned quantum states, instead of classical Shannon 
entropy, we can use von Neumann entropy and quantum relative entropy.  
*r
 
2.4   Security Problem in Quantum Cryptography 
 
In quantum cryptography, the best eavesdropping attacks use quantum cloning 
machines [10, 11, 12]. However, an eavesdropper cannot measure the state y  of a 
single quantum bit, since the result of her measurement is one of the single 
eigenstates of the quantum system. The measured eigenstate gives only very poor 
information to the eavesdropper about the original state y  [3, 9]. The 
eavesdropper’s cloning transformation is a trace-preserving and completely positive 
map and it can be described as { , Q } , where Q  is the eavesdropper’s ancilla 
state. The process of cloning pure states can be generalized as  
,
a b x ab
Qy Ä S Ä  Y
c
                                   (5) 
where y  is the state in Hilbert space to be copied, S  is a reference state and Q  
is the ancilla state [10]. As Wooters and Zurek have shown, an unknown quantum 
state 0y a b= + 1  cannot be cloned perfectly [9], however it was later shown 
that an unknown quantum state can be cloned approximately [11, 12]. A cloning 
machine is called symmetric if at the output all the clones have the same fidelity, 
and asymmetric if the clones have different fidelities [11, 12]. The effect of the 
eavesdropper’s quantum cloner simply shrinks the Bloch-ball with probability p. The 
general model of Eve’s cloning machine is shown in Figure 5 [6, 11, 12, 13].  
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Figure 5. General model of Eve’s quantum cloner. 
  
 
The input qubit state is denoted by x, which is initially in an entangled state with 
a reference qubit r, denoted by the Bell state 
rx
+F . After the cloning 
transformation, the overall system consists of the three outputs and the reference 
quantum state, thus the output state rabcY  can be written as a superposition of 
double Bell states [9]:  
, ,ra bc v z x y
+ + - - + + - -Y = F F + F F + Y Y + Y Y              (6) 
where  and v are complex amplitudes with , ,x y z 2 2 2 2 1x y z v+ + + = . The 
qubit pairs ra and bc are Bell mixtures with 2 xx p= , 
2
yy p= , 
2
zz = p  and 
2
1v = -
.zp
.p
)
 Equation  describes a three-dimensional surface in the 
space, where each point (  represents parameters  and 
 This surface is an oblate ellipsoid  [3, 10, 11, 12] and we denote the 
coordinates of the ellipsoid  by . The ellipsoid   has polar radius 
,v x y z= + +
), ,x y z

2 2,  x yx p y p= =
2z = 
z( , ,x y 
1
2
x = , while the equatorial radius is  [10, 15]. In Figure 6, we have 
illustrated the effects of phase-covariant and universal quantum cloners that have 
been analyzed.  
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Figure 6. Comparison of UCM and phase-covariant based attack in ellipsoidal representation. 
 
The radii which describe the shrinking of the cloned state are denoted by  
and  in the three-dimensional ellipsoidal representation. 
,phasecovr
,UCMr
 
  
3   Cloning Machine-Based Attacks in Quantum 
Cryptography 
 
Our security analysis is based on the DPS quantum cryptography protocol. In this 
setting, we model the attacks against the DPS QKD protocol as follows: Alice sends 
a qubit y  to Bob and Eve clones the sent qubit using her ancilla qubit .E  In the 
cloning process, Eve’s ancilla state E  interacts with the sent qubit y  and the 
unknown state is forwarded to Bob who makes his standard measurement. To realize 
a coherent attack, it can be assumed that Eve can store her qubit, and she can make 
a post measurement on the collected qubits [3]. If Eve uses a phase-covariant cloning 
machine, then she clones only equatorial states (1 0 1
2
ie jy = + ).  In that case, 
if she uses a universal cloner, then she clones all the states, hence if the value of the 
parameter  is independent of the input quantum state EveF y . The quantum 
cloning transformation is optimal [10, 12], if 2 ,
3
h =  and hence the maximum fidelity 
of optimal universal cloning is 5 ,
6Eve
F =  and the maximum radius is 2 .
3
UCM
Ever =  
The quantum information-theoretical radius can be defined as 
 where  is the von Neumann entropy of the corresponding 
quantum state with radius . In general, the universal cloning machine output 
state can be given as [10, 11, 12] 
(*UCM UCMEve Eve ),1r r= - S S
UCM
Ever
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We note, that universal cloning also has direct application to eavesdropping 
strategies in Six-state quantum cryptography. Here, we study the information 
geometric properties of this cloner from the viewpoint of DPS QKD protocol. The 
optimal fidelity of 1 to 2 phase-covariant cloning transformation is given by 
sec .
1 2
1 1
0.8535
2 8
pha ovF  = + »    [10, 11, 12]. If Eve has a phase-covariant quantum 
cloner, then the maximum value of her radius is sec . 12
8
pha ov
Ever = . The quantum 
information-theoretical radius  of the phase-covariant cloner can be defined 
as . The phase-covariant quantum cloning 
transformation produces two copies of the equatorial qubit with optimal fidelity.  
* secpha ov
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3.1   Proposed Model for Quantum Cloning-Based Eavesdropping 
Detection 
 
The information-theoretical impacts of the eavesdropper’s cloning machine are 
measured by the radius  of the smallest enclosing quantum informational ball. We 
use the Delaunay tessellation, because it is the fastest known tool for seeking the 
center of the smallest enclosing ball of points [7, 16]. As the first part of our theorem, 
for a secure quantum channel, the radius  of the smallest enclosing quantum 
information ball of mixed states has to be greater than , thus . As the 
second part, for an insecure quantum channel, the radius  is smaller than or equal 
to , thus . In Figure 7, we show a geometrical interpretation of our 
model for a secure and for an attacked quantum channel [3, 17].  
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Figure 7. Radius of the smallest enclosing information ball for secure and attacked quantum 
communication. 
 
The information-theoretical effect of the eavesdropper’s cloning machine is described 
by the radius  of the smallest enclosing quantum informational ball. The quantum 
information-theoretical radius  is equal to the maximum quantum informational 
distance from the center and can be expressed as:   
*r
*r
( ) ( )(* min max .r Ds r r s=   )
).
                                (8) 
In our geometrical approach, we compute the smallest enclosing information ball by 
Delaunay tessellation, which is the fastest known tool to seek the center of a smallest 
enclosing ball of points [7, 16]. For UCM and phase-covariant cloning, the connection 
between information-theoretical radius  and Bloch vector  can be defined as:  *r Blochr
(* 1 Blochr r= - S                                          (9) 
  
The information-theoretical radius of UCM and phase-covariant cloners are denoted 
by  and . *UCMr
*
.phasecovr
 
3.2   Attacks against the DPS QKD Protocol 
 
To analyze the possible effects of an eavesdropper, we will use two kinds of quantum 
cloners, the most general universal quantum cloner and the phase covariant cloner. 
Other possible attacks against the protocol, such as sequential attacks, unambiguous 
state discrimination attacks or minimum error discrimination methods have been 
analyzed, and upper bounds have been obtained [1, 2].  
 
3.2.1   Collective Attack 
 
This paper analyzes the most general attack against the DPS QKD protocol, the 
collective attacks. The security bounds for this type of attack were analyzed by 
Biham and Mor [26], and they have concluded the same bound holds for the protocol. 
In this attacker model, the eavesdropper tries to clone each of the quantum states 
sent by Alice, following an independent cloning strategy. The eavesdropper can 
change her strategy in a probabilistic way, hence in practical QKD applications, Eve 
can stop her cloning activity for a while, and then later, she can attack again. By 
changing the used strategies, she can decrease the probability of detection of her 
activity in the quantum channel.  
In a collective attack, an eavesdropper can use a quantum memory to store her 
quantum states, and she can delay the whole measurement process. She can collect 
the required information from the steps of key agreement between Alice and Bob, 
which can be used to choose the best measurement strategy on the collected 
quantum states. 
As has been shown by Devetak and Winter [27], the generic security bound for an 
collective attack can be given by the Csiszár–Körner bound [28] for one-way 
postprocessing as   with  where 
 is the eavesdropper’s information about the raw key of Alice and Bob, and 
 can be expressed as  
( ) (: min ,AE BEI A B I I- ) )E
)
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( ) ( ) ( )H A H B H AB+ - .                                   (10) 
To compute the c  Holevo quantity, we will use our geometrical approach, with 
quantum relative entropy as distance measure. Geometrical, this quantity can be 
expressed as the radius of the smallest enclosing quantum informational ball, hence  
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where  is the Holevo quantity, a  is Alice’s output with probability distribution 
, and 
c
( )p a E ar  is Eve’s ancilla and ( )E
a
p ar = å E ar  is the partial state of the 
eavesdropper. We note, that the same equation can be applied between Alice and 
Bob, when Bob is also able to store the quantum states.                                                                          
In our geometrical approach, we will use the radius of the smallest enclosing 
quantum informational ball to approximate the eavesdropper’s maximal obtainable 
information. The size of the smallest quantum informational ball depends only on the 
properties of the eavesdropper’s states E ar , and it is independent of the chosen 
measurement strategy, hence our analysis can be extended to not just a very specific 
examples of set of cloned quantum states.  
We note that the eavesdropper’s most general strategy can include many possible 
variations which cannot be parameterized efficiently. However the security bounds 
for general or coherent attacks are the same as for collective attacks, hence our 
geometrical approach can be used to analyze both collective and coherent attacks.  
 
3.2.2   Collective Beam-Splitting Attack against the DPS QKD  
 
As has been shown by Branciard, Gisin, and Scarani [24], the simplest realization of 
a collective attack against the DPS QKD protocol is the beam-splitting attack, hence 
in this paper we use this type of attack to describe the informational-theoretic 
security of the DPS QKD protocol.  
To describe the coherent beam-splitting attack, we model Alice’s sent states as a 
sequence of coherent states ( )i iyÄ , where each  is chosen from the set 
, and the logical value of the bit is 0 if , and 1 if 
. In the collective beam-splitting attack, the eavesdropper uses a 
beamsplitter to get a fraction of the signal. The remaining fraction of the signal, 
denoted by t , is sent directly to Bob, hence Bob will receive the state  
( )iy
{ ,y y+ -
( )1iy - =
( )
} )iy
)iy
( ) (1iy - =
(-
i iy tÄ , and similarly, the eavesdropper’s state can be described as 
( ) 1 .i iy tÄ -  The eavesdropper’s information can be given by using the von 
Neumann entropy, as 
( ) ( ) (01 12 2DPSE E EI r r r= - -S S S )1E ,                       (12) 
where it is assumed that the probability of each logical bit value is equal, hence 
0
1 1
2 2E E
r r r= + 1E
)iy )iy
.                                   (13) 
Using the coding scheme  for 0, and  for 1, the 
state of 
( ) (1iy - = ( ) (1iy - = -
0Er  and 1Er  can be expressed as  
  
0 ,
1 1
2 2E E E EE
P Py y y yr + + - -= + ,  and 1 ,1 12 2E E E EE P Py y y yr + - - += + ,        (14) 
where 1Ey y= - t  and  is the projector. Using , we can introduce a new 
parameter,  
E
Py Ey
( )2 1 ,Ee ey mg - - -= = t                                       (15) 
where  is the intensity of the sent weak coherent pulse. Using this parameter, the 
inner product between 
m
2
E Ey y g+ - = , for given  intensity, the eavesdropper’s 
information can be expressed as  
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where is the binary entropy function.  H
Using our geometrical approach, the connection between the practically achievable 
secret key rate K of the protocol and the radius  of the smallest enclosing 
quantum informational ball of the eavesdropper can be given by:  
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(17) 
where  is the raw key rate and v  is the repetition rate.  R
In the numerical analysis section of this paper, we will show the results of our 
information-theoretic security analysis of QKD protocol. We will describe the 
maximal obtainable information of the eavesdropper by the radius of the smallest 
enclosing quantum informational ball.  
 
3.3   Geometrical Modeling of DPS QKD Protocol 
 
In phase-coding QKD schemes, a signal consists of a superposition of two time-
separated pulses. These methods, instead of polarization encoding, encode the 
information in the relative phase between two pulses. However, the polarization and 
phase encoding schemes are equivalent mathematically [1, 2], hence in our 
information geometrical security analysis, we can use the Bloch-ball representation to 
study the security of the protocol. We can use the following translation between the 
basis states 0 , 1  on the Bloch-ball, and the relative phases of the first signal 1S , 
and the second signal 2S :  
  
{ } ( ) (1 2 1 21 10 , 1 , .
2 2
S S S S
ì üï ïï ï= + -í ýï ïï ïî þ
)                   (18) 
Hence for example, the   polarization state on the Bloch-ball can be rewritten in 
the following form: 
( ) ( 1 21 10 1
2 2
S i S= + = + ) .                       (19) 
In the case of  , the relative phase between signals 1S  and 2S  is . As we 
can conclude, the information encoded in the polarization and in the relative phases 
are equivalent.  
p
In our geometrical analysis of the DPS QKD protocol, we have used the following 
conventions of the relative phases of the signals and the polarization states on the 
Bloch-ball:  
( )
( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
1
0 ,
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S S
S i S
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+ = + =  .
                   (20) 
In Figure 8 we have illustrated these conventions in the notations of our security 
analysis. The first and the second signals are denoted by 1S  and 2S .  
 
 
 
Figure 8. The notations used in the geometrical analysis of DPS QKD protocol. The relative 
phases between the pulses can be represented by polarization angles on the Bloch-ball. The 
phase encoding and polarization encoding schemes are equivalent mathematically and in our 
geometrical security analysis. 
 
The soundness of these notations of our geometric analysis is based on the fact that 
the relative phases between the pulses can be represented by polarization angles on 
the Bloch-ball, since the phase encoding scheme and the polarization encoding 
scheme are mathematically the same [1, 2, 3, 19, 20]. Using this equivalence, the 
  
time-delay which is caused by the eavesdropper, can be analyzed by the fidelity of 
her quantum cloner.   
Hence, the DPS QKD protocol can be modeled in terms of the polarization states of 
the B92 protocol. It uses only two polarization states, and the key can be described 
by a random sequence  of logical bits, and the generated N-length 
qubit string is: 
( 1 2, , NB b b b=  )
1 2
1
,
N i
N
b b b b
i
y y y y y
=
= Ä Ä Ä = Ä                     (21) 
where  is the basis of the i-th qubit [9]. In our geometrical analysis, the i-th qubit ib
ib
y  in the string is generated according to the B92 coding convention, as 
0y = «  and 1 .y =   In Figure 9 we illustrated the two polarization states 
of the DPS QKD protocol, used in our information geometric security analysis. 
        
 
Figure 9. The polarization states of B92 protocol. 
 
In general, these polarization states can be expressed by means of some orthogonal 
basis { 0 , 1 }  as follows:  
0a ba =  1 ,                                        (22) 
where the coefficients can be given by  
( )21 1
2
a e am-= +  and ( )21 1
2
b e am-= - ,                       (23) 
and  and , and a  if  ,a b Î  2 2 1a b+ = b> 0.am ¹
In Figure 10 we show the polarization states of 0a ba =  1  in the Bloch-ball 
representation, and we depict the p  phase difference between quantum states 
{ }1 2,r r  and { 3 4,r r } . In practice, Alice sends a WCP signal, whose phases 
  
are randomly modulated by 0 or p . In our security analysis, these WCP signals are 
modeled by the quantum states { }1 2,r r  and { 3 4,r r }  on the Bloch-ball.   
 
 
Figure 10. The WCP pulses of DPS QKD protocol are modeled by different polarization 
states. 
 
In Figure 11 we show the result of the eavesdropper’s attack. For the best results, 
Eve uses the universal cloner for non-equatorial states  and , and the phase-
covariant cloner for equatorial states. The Delaunay tessellation of these cloned 
states is different from the Delaunay tessellation of pure states, and the radius of the 
smallest enclosing quantum informational ball will be also different [7, 16].  
1 2,r r 3r
 
 
Figure 11. The tessellation of the Bloch-ball for cloned quantum states differs from the 
diagram of the pure states originally sent. 
 
As can be concluded, the smallest enclosing quantum informational ball contains all 
the cloned states. The length of the radius of the smallest quantum informational 
ball describes the eavesdropper’s maximally obtainable information. In Figure 12 we 
show the smallest enclosing quantum informational ball and the convex hull of the 
quantum states.  
  
 
 
Figure 12. The radius of the smallest quantum informational ball describes the 
eavesdropper’s maximum obtainable information. The algorithm computes the length of the 
information-theoretical radius by the determination of the convex hull of mixed quantum 
states. 
 
In the next section we show the methods for convex hull calculation, and our 
techniques for the determination of smallest quantum informational ball.  
3.4   Computation of Delaunay Triangulation on Bloch sphere 
We would like to compute the information-theoretical radius  of the smallest 
enclosing ball of the cloned mixed quantum states which describes the eavesdropper’s 
maximal obtainable information, thus we must first seek the center c  of the set of 
quantum states  . The set   of quantum states is denoted by  . The 
distance d  between any two quantum states of   is measured by the quantum 
relative entropy, thus a minimax mathematical optimization is applied to the 
quantum relative entropy-based distances to find the center c  of the set  .  We 
denote the quantum relative entropy from c  to the furthest point of   by 
. Using a minimax optimization, we can minimize the 
maximal quantum relative entropy from c  to the furthest point of   by 
. In Figure 13, we have illustrated the circumcenter  of    
for the Euclidean distance and for quantum relative entropy [5, 17].   
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Figure 13. Circumcenter for Euclidean distance and quantum relative entropy. 
 
In classical computational geometry, Voronoi diagrams and Delaunay triangulations 
play an important role [7, 16]. A Voronoi diagram is a division of space. The dual 
diagram for a Voronoi diagram is called a Delaunay tessellation [7, 16]. In the graph 
of a Delaunay triangulation, any circle is empty if it contains no vertex of   in its 
interior. If two quantum states of set  are denoted by  and , then edge e  is in  
 if and only if there exists an empty circle that passes through  and . An 
edge satisfying the empty circle property is said to be Delaunay. The Delaunay 
triangulation is guaranteed to be a triangulation only if the vertices of   are in a 
general position, thus there are no four quantum states of   lying on the same circle. 
The circumcircle of a triangle is the unique circle that passes through all three of its 
vertices, and the triangle is Delaunay if and only if its circumcircle is empty. The 
quantum Delaunay triangulation of a set of quantum states  , denoted by , 
is the geometric dual of quantum Voronoi diagrams vo . In Figure 14 we 
compare a classical Euclidean Delaunay and a quantum informational Delaunay 
triangulation for a set of quantum states.  
 r s
)
( )Del  r s
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Figure 14. Comparison of classical Euclidean (a) and quantum Delaunay triangulation (b). 
 
The quantum Voronoi diagrams can be first-type or right-sided diagrams. Similarly, 
we can derive two triangulations from quantum Voronoi diagrams. The first-type 
quantum informational ball circumscribing any simplex of quantum Delaunay 
triangulation  is empty. If we choose a subset ¡  of at most  states in ( )Del  1d +
  
{ 1, , nr r=  } , then the convex hull of the associated quantum states , is 
a simplex of the quantum triangulation of  , iff there exists an empty quantum 
informational ball B passing through the r . The first-type and second-type 
quantum diagrams for quantum states which have non-equal radii, are different. In 
Figure 15, we compare the first-type and second-type quantum Delaunay diagrams 
for mixed quantum states on the Bloch sphere.  
,i ir Î ¡
,  ii Î ¡
 
      
 
Figure 15. Comparison of first-type and second-type quantum Delaunay triangulations 
on the Bloch-ball. 
 
The security of the quantum channel is determined by our geometrical model based 
on the assumptions  and , and the approximate value of the 
fidelity parameter F , can be expressed as:  
* * ,Ever r>
Eve
* *
Ever r£
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 1
2
in inout
EveF ry r y= = ).+
)
)
                             (24) 
The approximated value of the information-theoretical impacts of the eavesdropper is 
obtained by , the radius of the smallest information ball.  *r
 
 
4   Geometrical Representation of Quantum States 
 
The quantum relative entropy for general quantum state  and mixed 
state , with radii 
( , ,x y zr =
( , ,x y zs =    2 2r x yr = + + 2z  and 2 2 2y z+r xs = +  is 
given by  
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( )
( )
2 2
1 11 1 1 1 1 1
log 1 log log 1 log , ,
2 4 2 2 4 2 11
r r
D r r r
r rr
r s
r r s
s sr
r s r s+ += - + - - - --
  (25) 
  
where (, xx yy zzr s = + +  )
)
. For a maximally mixed state 
 and , the quantum relative entropy can be expressed 
as  
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The relative entropy of quantum states can be described by a strictly convex and 
differentiable generator function :  F
( ) ( ) ( )log ,Trr r r= - =F S r                               (27) 
where -  is the negative entropy of quantum states. The quantum relative entropy S
( )r sD  for density matrices r  and s  is given by generator function F  in the 
following way:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),D r s r s r s s= - - - F F F ,                    (28) 
where ( *, Trr s rs= )  is the inner product of quantum states and  is the 
gradient.  
( ) ⋅F
In Figure 16, we have depicted the quantum informational distance, (D r s ) , as the 
vertical distance between the generator function F  and , the hyperplane 
tangent to F  at . The point of intersection of quantum state r  on  is 
denoted by H .   
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Figure 16. Depiction of generator function as a negative von Neumann entropy. 
 
For the quantum informational distance function, the generator function is the 
negative von Neumann entropy function - ,   S
( ) ( ) ( )log ,Trr r r= - =F S r

                                 (29) 
where . The quantum informational distance function ( ): dF S  ( )D r sF  
with generator function  is illustrated in Figure  17 [31-36].  ( ) ( )r = -F S r
  
 
Figure 17. Negative von Neumann generator function. 
 
The quantum informational distance has some distance-like properties, however it is 
not commutative [4, 6, 7], thus ( ) ( ,D Dr s s r¹ )  and ( ) 0D r s ³  iff  
and 
,r s¹
( ) 0D r s =  iff   .r s=
 
4.1   Laguerre Diagram for Quantum States 
 
We use the Laguerre Delaunay diagram [7, 8] to compute the radius of the smallest 
enclosing ball. In general, the Laguerre distance for generating points  with weight 
, in a Euclidean space is defined by [33-35]  
ix
2
ir
( ) 2 2,L i id x x rr r= - - i
) )
.   (30) 
The Delaunay diagram for the Laguerre distance is called the Laguerre-Delaunay 
diagram. For the Laguerre bisector of two three-dimensional Euclidean balls 
 and  centered at quantum states  and , we can write the 
equation [31-36] 
( , PB rr ( , QB rs r s
2 22 , , , 0.Q Px rs r r r s s- + - + - =r
)
   (31) 
In a Euclidean space, the Laguerre distance  with weight  can be 
interpreted as the square of the length of the line segment starting at  and tangent 
to the circle centered at  with radius 
( ,L id xr 2ir
r
ix
2
ir . Thus, the circle centered at  with 
radius 
ix
2
ir  is the circle associated with  [7, 8], [31-36].  ix
We show a new method for deriving the quantum relative entropy-based 
Delaunay tessellation on the Bloch-ball   to detect eavesdropping activity on the 
quantum channel. In our algorithm we present an effective solution to seek the center 
 of the set of smallest enclosing quantum information ball, using Laguerre diagrams 
[7, 8], [31-36].  
c
Our geometrical-based security analysis has two main steps:  
  
1. We construct Delaunay triangulation from Laguerre diagrams on the Bloch-
ball.  
2. We seek the center of the smallest enclosing ball. 
 
 
4.2   Quantum Delaunay Triangulation from Laguerre Diagrams  
 
As we have seen, in a Euclidean space, the Laguerre distance of a point x  to a 
Euclidean ball  is defined as ( ,b b rr= ) ( ) 2 2, ,Ld x x rr r= - -  and for n balls 
, where , the Laguerre diagram [7, 8] of  is defined as the 
minimization diagram of the corresponding n distance functions 
( ,i ib b rr= )i 1,i = , n ib
( ) 2 2.iLd x x rr= - -                                   (32) 
In Figure 18, we show the ordinary triangulation of quantum relative entropy-based 
Voronoi diagram [31-33]. 
 
Quantum
states on the
Bloch ball
 
Figure 18. Regular triangulation on the Bloch-ball. 
 
We use the result of Aurenhammer to construct the quantum relative entropy-based 
dual diagram of the Delaunay tessellation, using the Laguerre diagram of the n 
Euclidean spheres of equations [7] 
( )(, , 2i i i i i i ix xr r r r r r r¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢- - = + -F ), .                (33) 
The most important result of this equivalence is that we can efficiently construct a 
quantum relative entropy-based Delaunay triangulation on the Bloch sphere, using 
fast methods for constructing classical Euclidean Laguerre diagrams [7, 8]. 
 
4.3   Center of the Quantum Informational Ball 
 
In our security analysis we use an approximation algorithm from classical 
computational geometry to determine the smallest enclosing ball of balls using core-
sets. The core-sets have an important role in our calculation and approximate 
  
method. We apply the approximation algorithm presented by Badoui and Clarkson, 
however in our algorithm the distances between quantum states are measured by 
quantum relative entropy [13]. The  -core set   is a subset of the set , such 
that for the circumcenter  of the minimax ball [5] 
Í 
c
( ) ( ), 1d £ +c   ,r
}nc
r+
)c
                                     (34) 
where r is the radius of the smallest enclosing quantum information ball of the set of 
quantum states   [13]. The approximating algorithm, for a set of quantum states 
 and circumcenter , first finds the farthest point  of ball set B, 
and moves c  towards  in  time in every iteration step.  
{ 1, , nS s s=  } c
)
ms
ms (dn
The algorithm seeks the farthest point in the ball set 
 by maximizing the quantum 
informational distance for a current circumcenter position  as 
. Using equation , we get 
( ) ( ){ 1 1 1, , , ,n nB b Ball r b Ball r= = =c 
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In Figure 19, we illustrate the smallest enclosing ball of balls in the quantum space 
[32-35].  
 
 
Figure 19. The smallest enclosing ball of a set of balls in the quantum space. 
 
We denote the set of n d-dimensional balls by , where 
,  is the center of ball  and  is the radius of the i-th ball. The 
smallest enclosing ball of set B b  is the unique ball  
with minimum radius r  and center  [13]. The algorithm does 
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[5]. The smallest enclosing ball of ball set B can be written as 
  
( )min ,Bc F c                                                (36) 
where  and the distance function  
measures the relative entropy between quantum states [6, 13].  The minimum ball of 
the set of balls [33-36] is unique, thus the circumcenter  of the set of quantum 
states is   
( ) ( ) { } (1, ,, max ,B iX d X B d X BÎ= =F 
( )* argmin .B= cc F c
)n i ( ),d ⋅ ⋅
*c
The main steps of our algorithm can be summarized as [34-36]: 
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At the end of our algorithm, the radius  of the smallest enclosing ball with respect 
to the quantum informational distance is equal to the information-theoretical fidelity 
of the cloning transformation.  
*r
 
5   Fitting the Smallest Quantum Informational Ball 
 
Geometrically, the smallest quantum informational ball can be computed from the 
intersection of contours of the quantum relative entropy ball with the ellipsoid of the 
secret channel, which ellipsoid is generated by the eavesdropper’s cloner machine. 
The maximum length radius  can be determined by an iterative algorithm, using 
the quantum relative entropy as a distance measure [41-42].  
rr
In Figure 20(a), the smallest quantum informational ball with radius 
(* maxr D r s= r r )  intersects the channel ellipsoid at magnitude m  of the Bloch 
vector . The Euclidean distance between the origin and center is denoted by 
. Similarly, the Euclidean distance between the origin and state r   is denoted by 
. In our geometrical iteration algorithm, we would like to determine the location 
of vector  inside the channel ellipsoid such that, the largest possible contour value 
r
*crr
ms
mr
sr
( )maxD r sr r  touches the channel ellipsoid surface and the remainder of the  maxD
  
contour surface lies entirely outside the channel ellipsoid. The point on the channel 
ellipsoid surface is defined as the set of channel output r . The vector  is defined 
in the interior of the ellipsoid, as the convex hull of the channel ellipsoid. To 
determine the optimal length of the radius, the algorithm moves point .  
sr
s
As we move vector  from the optimum position, a larger contour corresponding 
to the larger value of the quantum relative entropy D will intersect the channel 
ellipsoid surface, thereby 
sr
(max Dr r sr r r )  will increase. We can conclude that vector 
 should be adjusted to minimize sr (max Dr r sr r r ) , as illustrated in Figure 20(b).   
     
 
Figure 20. Intersection of radius of smallest enclosing quantum informational ball and 
channel ellipsoid (a). The optimal ball is shown in light-grey (b). 
 
The computed radius is equal to the radius of the smallest quantum informational 
ball, hence the quantum informational radius can be used to derive the fidelity of the 
eavesdropper’s quantum cloner machine. The vector  should be adjusted to 
minimize the value of 
sr
(max Dr r sr r r ) . To find the optimal value of vector  in 
our geometrical analysis, we choose a start point for vector  in the interior of the 
ellipsoid.  
sr
sr
 In Figure 21(a), we show the initial start point inside the channel ellipsoid 
chosen by the algorithm. The vector of state s  is denoted by . In the next step, 
the algorithm determines the set of points to the vector  on the ellipsoid surface 
most distant from , using the quantum relative entropy as distance measure. In 
Figure 21(b), the new state is notated by . 
sr
r¢r
sr
r ¢
 
  
     
 
Figure 21. The algorithm determines the points on the ellipsoid surface most distant from 
the point, using the quantum relative entropy as distance measure. 
 
The maximum distance between the states can be expressed as (max Dr r s¢r r r )
,rr
. We 
choose a random Bloch sphere vector from the maximal set of points according to 
vector . The selected point is denoted by . The algorithm makes a step from  
towards the surface point vector  in the Bloch sphere space. In this step, the 
algorithm updates vector  to  
r¢r r¢¢r sr
r¢¢r
sr
( )* 1s sg g ¢¢= - +r r                                     (37) 
where  denotes the size of the step.  In Figure 22(a), the updated state and the 
vector of the state are denoted by r  and . The center of the quantum 
informational ball is denoted by . In Figure 22(b), we illustrate the quantum 
informational distance between the final center point and the maximal distance state 
, using the notation 
g
¢¢ r¢¢r
*
sr
r ( )ma . Using the updated vector , the algorithm 
continues to loop until 
x D
r r sr r r
*
sr
( )*s
sr
*x D
r r
¢
r r rma  no longer changes. We conclude that the 
iteration converges to the optimal , because the algorithm minimizes 
( )max r r sr r rD . 
      
Figure 22. The algorithm makes a step towards the found surface point vector and updates 
the vector. 
  
At the end of the iteration process, the radius of the smallest quantum informational 
ball can be expressed as  
(min max .Dr r sr r r )                                       (38) 
In Figure 23, we compare the smallest quantum informational ball and the ordinary 
Euclidean ball.  
        
 
Figure 23. The maximum distance states of the smallest balls differ for the quantum 
informational distance and Euclidean distance. 
 
We can conclude that the quantum states  and , which determine the 
Euclidean smallest enclosing ball are different from the states of the quantum 
informational ball. 
1 2,r r 3r
 
5.1   Smallest Quantum Informational Ball for UCM-Based Cloning 
 
The UCM cloner-based attack in the DPS QKD protocol can be detected if the 
radius  of imperfect UCM cloning is equal or greater than the radius  of the 
idealistic UCM ball in ellipsoid  representation, thus 
r ,UCMr

2 2 2
,
1 1
3
12 2UCM
r r x y z³ = + + = =     .                    (39) 
This surface is an oblate ellipsoid   and can be expressed by 
2 2 2 1 .
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x = , while the equatorial radius is z . The distance to the origin is 
, thus the closest point to the origin is at the pole of 
the ellipsoid   and can be expressed as [9, 10, 11, 12] 
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Using the ellipsoid   representation, we can model the effects of Eve’s quantum 
cloner. The cloning transformation will be detected by Bob, if the point ( )  
representing the quality of the cloning transformation, lies on or outside the optimal 
UCM ball, represented by ellipsoidal radius .  
, ,x y z  
,UCMr
In Figure 24, we illustrate the radius  of the UCM ball and the radius r  of 
the corresponding imperfect UCM cloning transformation. The origin of  represents 
zero cloning activity in the channel.  
,UCMr 

         
Figure 24. Comparison of optimal UCM and imperfect universal cloning. 
 
In our quantum informational distance-based geometrical security analysis, Bob will 
detect the quantum cloner, if , because in this case we can give the 
following condition for the radius  of his smallest enclosing quantum informational 
ball:  
,UCMr r³ 
*r
( ) ( )22 ,* 441 1 1 1
3 3
UCMrrr
æ öæ ö ÷÷ çç ÷÷ çç ÷÷ çç£ - - £ - - ÷÷ çç ÷÷ çç ÷÷÷ çç ÷è ø è ø
S S .                      (41) 
In this geometrical representation - if there is no quantum cloner on the quantum 
channel - then , thus in this case Bob has a quantum informational ball with 
radius   
0r =
* 1.r =
In Figure 25, we show the information-theoretical radii  and . The 
smallest enclosing quantum ball of the imperfect UCM cloner has radius  
*r *UCMr
( )2* 41 1
3
r
r
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç= - - ÷ç ÷ç ÷÷çè ø
S ,                                         (42) 
while the radius of the idealistic UCM-based cloning attack in the DPS QKD 
protocol can be expressed as 
  
( )2,* 41 1
3
UCM
UCM
r
r
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç= - - ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
S .                                   (43) 
The smallest quantum informational ball with radius  is shown in grey, the ball of 
the idealistic UCM cloner with radius  is shown in light grey.  
*r
*
UCMr
    
Figure 25. The smallest enclosing quantum informational ball of optimal and imperfect 
universal cloner. 
 
We can conclude that, if , then , hence the information-
theoretical radius will be smaller. 
,UCMr r³  * *UCMr r£
 
5.2   Smallest Quantum Informational Ball for Phase-covariant Based 
Attack  
 
In the phase-covariant based attack against the QKD quantum cryptography 
protocol, the cloning activity can be detected by Bob, if the radius r  of the 
imperfect phase-covariant cloner is equal or greater than the radius r  of the 
phase-covariant ball in the ellipsoid   representation,   

cov,phase
.,phasecovr r³ 
Using the ellipsoid   representation, we can model the effects of Eve’s phase-
covariant quantum cloner-based attack. The imperfect cloning transformation is 
denoted by point ( , which lies on or outside the optimal phase-covariant 
ball. 
), 0x ,z
  
 
 
Figure 26. The ellipsoidal radii for optimal phase-covariant cloning and imperfect cloning 
activity. 
 
The local coordinate system (  represents the quality of the cloning 
transformation, and the eavesdropping activity will be detected by Bob, if 
), 0,x z 
 2 2 2 40
3 3 8
r x z
æ ö÷ç= + + ³ -ç ÷ç ÷è ø   ÷ .                                 (44) 
Bob will detect the quantum cloner if , where r  is the radius 
representing the imperfect phase-covariant cloning attack. In this case, we can give 
the following condition for the information-theoretical radius r  of his smallest 
quantum informational ball 
,phasecovr r³  
*
( ) ( )22 ,* 33 1 11 1 1 1 1
2 2
phasecovrrr
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   (45) 
The smallest quantum informational ball with radius  is shown in grey, the 
maximal ball of the phase-covariant cloner is shown in light grey. In the figures the 
information-theoretical radius is denoted by . The quantum ball of the imperfect 
phase-covariant cloner is illustrated with radius 
*r
*r
( )2* 31 1
2
r
r
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the idealistic phase-covariant cloner is denoted by radius 
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In Figure 27, we compare an idealistic phase-covariant cloner quantum ball and an 
imperfect phase-covariant cloner quantum ball. 
 
 
Figure 27. The smallest enclosing quantum informational ball of optimal and imperfect 
phase-covariant cloner. 
 
It can be concluded that the information-theoretical radii for idealistic and imperfect 
phase-covariant cloning are different. 
 
5.3   Comparison of UCM and Phase-covariant Based Attacks  
 
In the three-dimensional   ellipsoid representation, the radius  of the 
phase-covariant cloner-based attack is smaller than radius . For the radius of 
the UCM and phase-covariant ball in the ellipsoidal  representation  
,phasecovr
,UCMr

,phasecov UCMr r< , ,                                     (48) 
where 2 2 2,
2 4
.
3 3 8
phasecovr x y z= + + = -      
In Figure 28, we illustrate  and  in the three-dimensional 
ellipsoidal representation. 
,phasecovr ,UCMr
 
  
          
Figure 28. Comparison of UCM and phase-covariant based attack in ellipsoidal 
representation. 
 
Using the results derived in Section 3.1, the following connection holds between radii 
 and  of the smallest enclosing quantum informational balls of UCM 
and phase-covariant cloning-based attack: 
*
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*
phasecovr
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r r
r r
æ ö æ÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç= - - £ = - -÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷è ø è
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(49) 
In Figure 29, we show the radii  and   of the smallest enclosing 
quantum informational ball for a UCM-based attack and for DPS QKD protocol, in 
the Bloch sphere representation. 
*
UCMr
*
phasecovr
 
Figure 29. Comparison of smallest enclosing quantum informational ball of UCM and phase-
covariant cloners. 
 
  
It can be concluded that the best quality of the two outputs simultaneously can be 
realized with a UCM. If an eavesdropper uses a phase-covariant cloner, one of the 
two outputs should have better fidelity, while the fidelity of the second output will 
be lower. 
 
5.4   Description of Different Cloner Machines for the DPS QKD 
 
Using the results derived in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, the quantum channel in the DPS 
QKD protocol is secure if conditions  and  hold for the 
radius of the smallest enclosing quantum informational ball. In our geometrical 
method, we compute , the radius of the smallest enclosing quantum informational 
ball, to determine the information-theoretic security of the quantum communication 
by the maximally obtainable information of the eavesdropper.  
* *
phasecovr r> * *UCMr r>
*r
 
5.4.1   Phase-covariant Cloning 
 
In this section, we illustrate the quantum informational balls for the analyzed 
quantum cloners. The randomly chosen sent pure quantum states cloned by Eve’s 
phase-covariant quantum cloner are denoted by  and . Using Delaunay 
tessellation, we compute the convex-hull of the cloned equatorial states  and 
. In Figure 30, we illustrate the convex-hull of cloned states in two- and three-
dimensional Bloch-ball representations. The curved geometrical structure of quantum 
Delaunay tessellation is well observable. 
1 2 3, ,r r r 4r
1 2 3, ,r r r
4r
     
Figure 30. The convex hull of cloned mixed states.  
 
From the convex set, we can compute the smallest enclosing quantum informational 
ball and its radius . In Figure 31, we have illustrated the Euclidean smallest 
enclosing ball by the dashed circle, and the quantum relative entropy ball.  
*r
  
       
Figure 31. The smallest enclosing quantum informational balls. 
 
From the smallest enclosing quantum informational ball, we can determine the radius 
, which describes the information-theoretical impact of the eavesdropper cloning 
machine. The center of the smallest enclosing quantum informational ball is denoted 
by . We can analyze similarly the properties of universal quantum cloner. 
*r
*c
 
5.4.2   Universal Cloning 
 
In Figure 32(a), we have illustrated the dual Delaunay tessellation for the cloned 
states and the three-dimensional convex hull (light-grey) of cloned states 
 and . From the convex hull, we compute the smallest enclosing 
quantum informational ball. In Figure 32(b), we illustrate the smallest quantum 
informational ball and its radius .  
1 2 3 4 5, , , ,r r r r r 6r
*r
    
Figure 32. The convex hull (a) and the smallest quantum ball (b) of the cloned mixed states 
generated by a universal quantum cloner. 
 
The radius of the smallest enclosing quantum informational ball of a phase-covariant 
cloner is greater for equatorial states than is that of a universal quantum cloner. On 
  
the other hand, the universal cloner shrinks all quantum states equally, while the 
phase-covariant cloner can be applied efficiently only for equatorial states.    
 
6   Optimized Geometrical Algorithm 
 
The quantum relative entropy-based algorithm at the i-th iteration gives an 
(1 i+ ) -approximation of the real circumcenter, thus to get an ( )  
approximation, our algorithm requires a time [13], [36-37] 
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by first sampling 1n e=  points. Based on the computational complexity of the 
smallest enclosing ball, the (  approximation of the fidelity of the eavesdropper 
cloning machine can be computed in a time  
)1 e+
2
.
d
e
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø                                                (51) 
In this section we improve our method to get a  
d
e
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø                                                 (52) 
time, ( -approximation algorithm in quantum space [13], [36-37].  )
e£
1 e+
In the proposed algorithm, the optimal radius is between , and the 
process terminates as d , in at most 
*r r r d£ £ +
1
e
æ ö÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø  iterations. The main steps of the 
improved approximation algorithm are [13], [33-36]: 
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6.1   Rate of Convergence 
 
In our experimental simulation, we have compared the core-set algorithm and our 
improved core-set algorithm to find the smallest enclosing quantum information ball. 
We have analyzed the approximation algorithms for 30 center updates and we have 
measured the quality of the approximation with respect to quantum relative entropy.  
The results of our simulation are shown in Figure 33. The x-axis represents the 
number of center updates to find the center of the smallest enclosing quantum 
informational ball, the y-axis represents the quantum informational distance between 
the found center c  and the optimal center .  *c
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Figure 33. The rate of converge of approximation algorithms. 
 
From the results, we can conclude that each algorithm finds the approximate center 
 to the optimal center  very fast. The quantum relative entropy-based 
approximation algorithms have a very accurate convergence of c  towards , 
however the improved core-set algorithm converges faster with a smaller number of 
center updates. 
c *c
*c
 
7   Results 
 
We have used the proposed computational geometric method to compute the radius 
of the smallest quantum informational ball, which measures the information obtained 
by the attacker. 
  
In Figure 34 we show the results of our analysis for a collective attack. The radius of 
the eavesdropper’s smallest enclosing quantum informational ball is described by Eq. 
(11). The effects of the disturbance caused by the eavesdropper is analyzed in the 
range of . The upper and lower bounds of radii of the eavesdropper’s smallest 
quantum ball are shown as the function of the disturbance, using UCM and phase-
covariant quantum cloners. 
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Figure 34. Results of information geometrical security analysis of DPS QKD protocol for 
collective attack. The eavesdropper’s obtainable information is described by the radius of the 
smallest enclosing quantum informational ball. (lower bound - solid lines, upper bound - 
dashed lines) 
 
We have used the mutual information analysis to show the security of the DPS QKD 
protocol against coherent attacks. The radius of the smallest enclosing informational 
ball, hence the maximal obtainable information of the eavesdropper, increases with 
the level of disturbance. However, in the tolerated range of the disturbance level of 
the DPS QKD protocol, the analyzed quantum cloners make no possible for an 
eavesdropper to realize a successful attack in practice. As it is well described by the 
radii of the smallest quantum informational balls, the UCM based attack allows Eve 
less information than the phase-covariant based attack, which result confirms the 
mutual information analysis of UCM and phase-covariant cloner based attacks [29, 
30]. The results of the information-theoretic based analysis confirmed the fact, that 
coherent attack does not help to Eve to increase her information about the key.   
 
8   Conclusions  
 
The DPS QKD protocol has become more popular among quantum cryptographic 
protocols, since it offers higher key rates and easier implementation. The DPS 
  
protocol is tailored for practical applications, and represents a more applicable 
protocol than other discrete- and continuous-variable QKD protocols, which were 
invented by theorists. A bound for the DPS protocol’s unconditional security is still 
missing. The differential phase-shift protocol has better rates and its practical 
realizations are much simpler. However the security of the DPS QKD protocol is still 
an open question, since it unconditional security has not been fully approved yet. 
The lower bounds on the security of DPS QKD scheme are currently an open 
question, and currently under research.  
Our geometrical approach could be a very valuable tool to analyze the still open 
questions on the security of DPS QKD protocol. Our geometrical approach can be 
extended to all possible attacks against the DPS QKD protocol and the still 
unknown lower bounds can be discovered. In this paper, we analyzed the most 
general collective attack against the protocol by information geometrical methods, 
and for different attacker strategies. Our method could be a very valuable tool to 
analyze practical DPS QKD implementations, since for a large set of quantum states, 
an extremely efficient algorithm is required to compute the radius of the smallest 
quantum informational ball. The proposed information geometrical method analyses 
the information-theoretic security of the DPS QKD protocol, and it could offer a 
very useful practical algorithmical solution to solve the still open and unknown 
questions related to the information-theoretic security of quantum cryptographic 
protocols.  
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